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PRINCIPAL
DOCTRINES
by
EPICURUS
From The Lives, Teachings, and Sayings of
Famous Philosophers
by Diogenes Laertius,
translated by Robert Drew Hicks (1925)
1. A happy and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings
no trouble upon any other being; hence he is exempt from
movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement
implies weakness
2. Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been
resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has
no feeling is nothing to us.
3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal
of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is
uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or
of both together.
4. Continuous pain does not last long in the body; on the
contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a short time, and even
that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the
body does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long
duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the
body.
5. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living
wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live
wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever
any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the person is
not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it
is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.
6. In order to obtain security from other people any means
whatever of procuring this was a natural good.
7. Some people have sought to become famous and renowned,
thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against
their fellow-humans. If, then, the life of such persons really
was secure, they attained natural good; if, however, it was
insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own
prompting they originally sought.
8. No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce
certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than
the pleasures themselves.
9. If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, -- if
this had gone on not only be recurrences in time, but all over
the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of human
nature, there would never have been any difference between one
pleasure and another, as in fact there is.
10. If the objects which are productive of pleasures to
profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind,
-- the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric
phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain; if, further,
they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have
any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be
filled with pleasures to overflowing on all sides and would be
exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from
all evil.
11. If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and
atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow
affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and
desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.
12. It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the
highest importance, if a person did not know the nature of the
whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell
us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment
of unmixed pleasures.
13. There would be no advantage in providing security against
our fellow humans, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences
over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever
happens in the boundless universe.
14. When tolerable security against our fellow humans is
attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford
supports and of material prosperity arises in most genuine
form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the
multitude.
15. Nature's wealth at once has its bounds and is easy to
procure; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite
distance.
16. Fortune but seldom interferes with the wise person; his
greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will be,
directed by reason throughout the course of his life.
17. The just person enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while
the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.
18. Pleasure in the body admits no increase when once the pain
of want has been removed; after that it only admits of
variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is
reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their
congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms.
19. Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of
pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.
20. The body receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and
to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, grasping
in thought what the end and limit of the body is, and
banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and
perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time.
Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour
of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the
mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.
21. He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is
to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the
whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any
need of things which are not to be won save by labor and
conflict.
22. We must take into account as the end all that really
exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our
opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty
and confusion.
23. If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no
standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even
those judgments which you pronounce false.
24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without
stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits
confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is
already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any
immediate perception of the mind, you will throw into
confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless
belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth
altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily
affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that
which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be
maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of
judging between right and wrong opinion.
25. If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of
your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of
this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some
other end, your acts will not be consistent with your
theories.
26. All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain
ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid
of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the
desires seem likely to produce harm.
27. Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure
happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most
important is the acquisition of friends.
28. The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing
we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also
enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life
nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.
29. Of our desires some are natural and necessary others are
natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural
nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion.
30. Those natural desires which entail no pain when not
gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are
also due to illusory opinion; and when they are not got rid
of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the
person's illusory opinion.
31. Natural justice is a symbol or expression of usefulness,
to prevent one person from harming or being harmed by another.
32. Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with
one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor
suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And
those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual
covenants to the same end are in like case.
33. There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement
made in reciprocal association in whatever localities now and
again from time to time, providing against the infliction or
suffering of harm.
34. Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its
consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension
that those appointed to punish such offenses will discover the
injustice.
35. It is impossible for the person who secretly violates any
article of the social compact to feel confident that he will
remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten
thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is
never sure he will not be detected.
36. Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit,
something found useful in mutual association; but in its
application to particular cases of locality or conditions of
whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances.
37. Among the things accounted just by conventional law,
whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be
useful, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the
same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove
suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is
no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed
by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior
conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so
long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but
look simply at the facts.
38. Where without any change in circumstances the conventional
laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to
correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not
really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be useful in
consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the
laws were for the time being just when they were useful for
the mutual association of the citizens, and subsequently
ceased to be just when they ceased to be useful.
39. He who best knew how to meet fear of external foes made
into one family all the creatures he could; and those he could
not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens; and where he
found even this impossible, he avoided all association, and,
so far as was useful, kept them at a distance.
40. Those who were best able to provide themselves with the
means of security against their neighbors, being thus in
possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable
life in each other's society; and their enjoyment of the
fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his
time, the survivors did not mourn his death as if it called
for sympathy.